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Abstract 
  
This thesis will focus on the link between Thatcherism and privatisation, and what its 
consequences were for Britain and the rest of the world. The main question will be: was the 
rise of Thatcherism intrinsically linked to privatisation and what were its consequences for 
Britain and the rest of the world? In order to answer this question, the thesis is divided in 
three chapters.  
The first chapter will look at the British economy since 1945. The perceived post-war 
consensus, the relative decline, difficult industrial relations and high inflation led to a 
seemingly ungovernable situation in the 1970s, culminating in the Winter of Discontent. This 
created a fertile ground for Thatcherism’s radical policies at the British electorate. 
 The second chapter will focus on the actual principles of Thatcherism and how these 
were shaped by circumstances and the work think-tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies. 
Disillusioned by the state of the country in the 1970s, Thatcher was attracted to the radical 
policies of Keith Joseph. Only a radical break with the post-war consensus was seen by 
Joseph and her as the solution to Britain’s problems. Thatcherism was born out of this 
process of re-thinking the Conservative Party’s policy. Its main focus was controlling 
inflation, individual freedom and rolling back the frontiers of the state. The ultimate goal was 
creating a thriving enterprise economy. 
 The third chapter looks at the large-scale privatisation programme under Thatcher. It 
analyses the state of the nationalised industries before 1979 and the economic policies during 
her administration, seeing a continuum with the overall objectives of the privatisation 
programme. One of the main objectives of this programme – the spreading of public 
ownership through shares – played a significant role in how privatisation was implemented 
from 1984 onwards. Privatisation through public share offering would eventually become the 
accepted privatisation method worldwide. The major privatisations of the 1980s reshaped 
Britain’s economic landscape en sparked privatisation programmes worldwide. In that regard, 
Thatcher’s privatisation programme changed the world economy. 
 This thesis states that Thatcherism’s core principles and Thatcher’s privatisation 
programme were intrinsically linked to each other. The privatisation programme altered the 
British economy and inspired other countries to pursue a similar policy of privatisation. 
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Introduction 
 
When Margaret Thatcher passed away on 8 April 2013, a debate ensued in Britain 
about her legacy. Her death inspired heated debates either fiercely in favour or fiercely 
against her policies and views. There appeared to be no middle ground.  An article published 
by The Economist a few days after her death stated that she ‘left behind a brand of politics 
and convictions which still resonate, from Warsaw to Santiago to Washington’, becoming the 
first British Prime Minister to give rise to an ‘-ism’ in her lifetime.1 
However, there seems to be disagreement about what this Thatcherism actually 
implied. Critics view Thatcher mainly as a crude pragmatist as she applied old ideas in a 
populist manner and dividing the country socially in the process. Thatcherites almost revere 
her as a freedom-fighter for individual freedoms vis-à-vis the state and the one who reversed 
the decline of Britain by solving many of its structural problems. The objective of this thesis 
is not to prove or disprove either side of the argument. Rather, it will focus on one of her 
most important legacies: privatisation. In the process I will show why Thatcherism and 
privatisation were intrinsically linked and what the consequences of privatisation were for 
Britain and the rest of the world. Therefore the main question this thesis will be trying to 
answer is: was the rise of Thatcherism intrinsically linked to privatisation and what were its 
consequences for Britain and the rest of the world? 
 The first chapter will focus on the British economy between 1945 and 1979. Its 
purpose is to demonstrate how the economic circumstances inspired Thatcherism. There was 
the idea of a ‘Keynesian consensus’ in British politics that occurred after the war. Whether 
there actually was such a thing is irrelevant, because Thatcherites believed there was and 
                                                 
1
 The Economist, ‘Margaret Thatcher: No Ordinary Politician’ (13 April 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21576081-margaret-thatcher-britains-prime-minister-1979-1990-died-
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inspired Thatcherism. This pre-history is relevant in order to better understand what 
Thatcherism was opposing. 
 The second chapter will focus on the main principles of Thatcherism. It builds on the 
first chapter and shows how a disillusioned Thatcher is drawn to the right-wing of the Tory 
Party. The influence of Keith Joseph, himself influenced by Hayek and Friedman, would be 
the basis of Thatcherism with its focus on individual freedom, financial discipline and focus 
on rolling back the frontiers of the state. 
 The third chapter will focus on the topic of privatisation. It explains why privatisation 
only gained momentum after 1984 and links the principles set out in the second chapter with 
the main objectives of the privatisation programme. The impact of privatisation on the British 
economy and the rest of the world are also analysed. 
 I have used a broad base of sources, both primary and secondary. Secondary sources, 
such as Eric Evans’ Thatcher and Thatcherism and Green’s Thatcher, were initially used as 
guidance to locate the proper primary sources. In numerous cases I have discovered that there 
was room for interpretation and came to a different conclusion. Other relevant sources 
involved economic data from institutions such as the World Bank and economic articles such 
as those written by Martin and Parker, Pill and Vogel, and Megginson and Netter. The goal 
was to remain as objective as possible and not let political bias of certain authors get in the 
way. 
Primary sources are used carefully in the case of memoirs as they tend to be biased in 
favour of its author. They will be used primarily to demonstrate the views of a certain 
individual, but his or her intention in writing the memoir should always be kept in mind. 
Another primary source regularly used are the election manifesto’s of both the Labour and 
the Conservative party. It is used primarily to demonstrate the political imperatives of the 
parties. 
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Chapter 1: The British Economy since 
1945 
 
In order to understand the rise of Thatcherism in general and privatisation in 
particular, one needs to understand the economy Thatcher had sought out to change. She 
wrote in one of her autobiographies that ‘the thirty-year experiment had plainly failed’ after 
the war and talked about the approach of contemporary governments as bad for the economy 
being ‘themselves “blind forces” blundering about in the dark, and obstructing the operations 
of markets rather than improving them.’ In her mind, there were three challenges that were a 
daunting inheritance for a New Prime Minister in 1979: ‘long-term economic decline, the 
debilitating effects of socialism, and the growing Soviet threat.’2  
After the 1979 elections Thatcher became Prime Minister. As a major critic of the 
economic demand management that had occurred after the Second World War – the so-called 
Keynesian consensus – she sought to turn around this development of increased government 
intervention. According to David Cannadine, Margaret Thatcher’s transformation ‘from 
welfare-state handmaiden and Heathite acolyte to monetarist prophet and apocalyptic 
crusader’ occurred in the 1970s and especially after she became Leader of the Opposition in 
1975. During this period she fell under the influence of Keith Joseph, a Conservative MP 
who became her mentor.
3
 
The main question that this chapter seeks to answer, is whether the economic situation 
in post-war Britain, the perception of relative decline, and the economic and social crises of 
the 1970s had created a fertile ground for the rise of Thatcherism?  
                                                 
2
 M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993), pp. 9-11 
3
 D. Cannadine, ‘Apocalypse when? British politicians and British ‘decline’ in the twentieth century’ in P. 
Clarke & C. Trebilcock ed., Understanding Decline: Perceptions and realities of British economic performance 
(Cambridge, 1997), pp. 261-84 at p. 276; also see M. Thatcher, The Path to Power (London, 1995), pp. 135-6, 
250-7  
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Thatcher’s rise and her radical policies did not spring out of nowhere. Eric Evans 
mentions in Thatcher and Thatcherism that there were three factors linking the post-war 
economy to ‘Thatcher’s experiment’ in the 1980s. The first factor was the relative decline 
after the Second World War despite simultaneous social advances. An example he gives is 
that whereas Britain had been ninth in GDP per head table in 1950, it had fallen to fifteenth 
place in 1971 and nineteenth in 1976. The second factor was the general crisis of confidence 
in the economic management after Keynesian policies had failed to bring down 
unemployment and inflation in the 1970s after the oil shock of 1973 and the breaking down 
of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in 1971/72. It led to economic misery and regular 
strikes in the 1970s. The third and last factor was that Thatcher’s predecessors, the Labour 
Prime Ministers Wilson and Callaghan, had demonstrated monetarist tendencies with 
stringent reductions in expenditure, wage restraint and moves towards a balanced budget. 
They had designed the so-called ‘social contract’ with trade union leaders where they 
discussed major issues. This way they tried to normalise the skew industrial relations. 
However, the contradictions of maintaining a deflationary policy while being a party that is 
paid by trade unions did not sustain itself, leading to the Winter of Discontent in 1978-79. 
The failure of this social contract and the economic and social chaos that followed set public 
opinion against trade unions, an opportunity Thatcher seized to break their power down.
4
 
This chapter will demonstrate the relevance of these three factors for the rise of 
Thatcherism. It will describe the build-up of the Keynesian consensus after the war, the 
relative decline Britain was facing, and the economic and even social crises in the 1970s. 
They all contributed to the rise of Thatcherism.  
                                                 
4
 E.J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism (2
nd
 edn, Oxford, 2004), pp. 9-12 
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The Post-War Consensus 
When the war was over in 1945, Thatcher argues in her memoirs that succeeding 
Conservative and Labour governments set out on a course of increased government 
intervention, and control of the economy had shifted to ‘disinterested civil services’ who 
pretended to know better than the blind forces of the ‘free market.’ ‘[W]e call them socialist, 
social democrat, statist or merely Butskellite – represented a centralizing, managerial, 
bureaucratic, interventionist style of government.’5 
The Second World War had a lasting impact on British politics long after the fighting 
had stopped. Whereas for the right-wing politicians the war had ‘embodied constructive 
patriotism and the will to victory’, the centre-left thought the wartime political organisation 
had ‘implied social cohesion, Keynesian budgetary management, economic planning, the 
human version of social citizenship embodied in the Beveridge Report. It offered the 
intellectual and historical underpinnings of the post-war consensus.’6  
The Beveridge Report, written in 1942, would also lead to the creation of a more 
egalitarian society by increasing social security payments and was responsible for the 
creation of the National Health Service (NHS) which made healthcare affordable or 
sometimes free for all citizens. As a consequence this inevitably meant higher tax rates, 
particularly for higher incomes.  Higher taxation during the war and afterwards thus led to 
larger government budgets afterwards.
7
 
This idea of a post-war consensus was not an uncontested idea. It was not the case 
that in the post-war period the parties had ‘more in common than the differences between 
them and that government, especially management of the economy, had proceeded according 
to a broad agreement.’ What did bind the two ruling parties after 1945 together was their 
acceptance of ‘[f]ull employment and the maintenance of the Welfare State’ as primary 
                                                 
5
 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 6 
6
 K.O. Morgan, Britain Since 1945: The People’s Peace, (3rd edn., Oxford, 2001), p. 4 
7
 Pill & Vogel, ‘Blair Wealth Project’, p. 3-4 
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goals.
8
 It involved Keynesian demand management and used mainly fiscal techniques to 
‘produce sustained growth.’9 
This demand management was ‘based on discretionary fiscal policy, aimed at fine 
tuning the economy and seeking to respond to changing economic conditions to ensure both 
that demand was high enough to avoid return to the high unemployment of the 1930s and also 
to smooth out business-cycle fluctuations.’ This was built upon the Keynesian notion that the 
government could lower unemployment by adopting expansionary economic policies that 
would expand the level of demand in the economy.
10
 Basically, this involved increased 
government intervention. 
Both the Labour and Conservative Party accepted the mixed economy that this system 
of government intervention produced in the first three decades after the war. The concept of 
mixed economy is defined by Bradley Schiller as an ‘economy that uses both market signals 
and government directives to allocate goods and resources.’11 In other words, it is not a 
socialist-planned economy, but it also is not a completely free-market economy. Rather, it is 
a hybrid of the two. A consequence of the Conservatives’ acceptance of the mixed economy, 
they did not turn back Attlee’s nationalisation of industries between 1945 and 1951 when 
they were in power between 1951 and 1964 (see chapter 3). Concerning economic policy, it 
was kept on the move ‘by corporate negotiations between government, business, and a hugely 
expanded trade union movement.’12 This was what the Keynesian consensus was all about: 
involving all the parties in decision-making regarding economic policies.  
The two main objectives of post-war British governments were full employment and 
keeping a fixed exchange rate with the Unites States according to the Bretton Woods system. 
                                                 
8
 P. Jenkins, Mrs Thatcher’s Revolution; The Ending of the Socialist Era (London, 1987), pp. 3, 5 
9
 Morgan, Britain Since 1945, p. 5 
10
 N.F.R. Crafts & N.W.C. Woodward, ‘The British Economy since 1945: Introduction and Overview’ in N.F.R. 
Crafts & N.W.C. Woodward ed., The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford, 1991), p. 2 
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 B. Schiller, The Economy Today, (12
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 edn., New York, 2012), p. 15 
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 Morgan, Britain Since 1945, p. 6 
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However, these objectives were not necessarily complementary to each other. They led to so-
called ‘stop-and-go cycles’. In the case of rising unemployment, the government would 
implement expansionary policies such as tax cuts, higher public expenditures, and lower 
interest levels to bring the unemployment level down again. These expansionary policies 
would in turn lead to inflation and the balance of payments would suffer. Because dollar 
reserves were finite and there was limited capital mobility, the reversal of expansionary 
policies would be necessary in order to avoid devaluation of the pound. Obviously this once 
again led to higher unemployment. Responding similarly as before, the cycle would start all 
over again. According to Roger Middleton, Britain had a total of four of these stop-and-go 
cycles between 1951 and 1971.
13
 
Industrial Relations 
The heart of the problem of these were the adversarial nature of industrial relations in 
Britain at the time. Wage moderation was required for full employment to be consistent with 
price stability. However, unions had a powerful legal position in post-war Britain. A secret 
ballot was not required for striking, secondary picketing – i.e. disrupting operations of parties 
not involved in the dispute – was allowed, and ‘closed shops’ – i.e. the obligation of 
companies to hire union members – were ubiquitous.14 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC) was a national organisation that represented the 
collective interests of most trade unions. It had founded the Labour Party in 1900 and kept 
financing it for the rest of the twentieth century. Unions had been heavily involved in the war 
effort and the nationalisation of industries afterwards. This made them a powerful force in the 
British economy. Approximately 45% of British workers were member of a union, three-
quarters of which belonged to the TUC. However, the independent unions kept control over 
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 R. Middleton, The British Economy Since 1945 (New York, 2000), p. 103 
14
 Pill & Vogel, ‘Blair Wealth Project’, p. 3-4 
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their financial and decision-making powers. This made the TUC an ‘outwardly formidable 
but ultimately weak organisation of fragmented affiliates with no control over member’s 
operations or funds.’15 
Added to this fragmentation of collective bargaining power was the power of plant-
level shop stewards. These had a lot of influence on industrial relations due the lack of 
control union officials had over them and their frequent threats to use ‘unauthorised’ strikes. 
Symptomatic for this was the fact that Britain had 38 times more days lost to strikes than 
Germany between 1966 and 1970. The fragmentation of collective bargaining and the power 
of shop stewards combined made ‘British manufacturing enterprises so vulnerable to worker 
actions and that reinforced Britain’s lag in productivity growth.’16 
Relative Economic Decline 
After the Second World War, Britain’s significance in the world economy had shrunk 
dramatically. Its share of world manufacturing exports decreased from 35% around 1900 to 
25.5% in 1950. This relative decline would continue after the war. Furthermore, Britain had 
to devalue the pound in 1949 and it also lost most of its colonies after the war. The United 
States, other continental European countries and Japan all outpaced Britain when it came to 
productivity and output growth during the first three decades of the post-war period.
17
  
Table 1 shows the declining share of Britain in manufactured world exports after the 
Second World War until the end of the 1980s. The UK was also losing ground on the other 
developed countries during that period when it came to GDP per capita as shown in table 2. 
This steady loss of economic supremacy generated a sense of declinism especially with 
Thatcherites.  
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 B. Ebbinghaus & J. Visser, Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945 (New York, 2000), p. 714 
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 R. Dore, W. Lazonick & M. O’Sullivan, ‘Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century’, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, vol. 15, no. 4 (1999), pp. 102-120 at pp. 110-111 
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Table 1 Share of World Manufactured Exports (%) 
 
1950 1960 1970 1979 1988 
UK 25.5 16.5 10.8 9.1 8.3 
USA 27.3 21.6 18.5 16.0 14.9 
France 9.9 9.6 8.7 10.5 9.1 
Germany 7.3 19.3 19.8 20.9 20.6 
Japan 3.4 6.9 11.7 13.7 18.1 
Source:  Crafts, N.F.R. & Woodward, N.W.C. ed., The British Economy since 1945 (Oxford, 1991), p. 12 
 
 
Table 2 GDP per capita in international dollars (UK = 100) 
  1950 1973 1987 
USA 160.6 148.1 147.6 
France 70.5 100.7 103.2 
Germany 60.1 102.5 108.6 
Japan 26.8 89.3 106.3 
Source:  Crafts & Woodward ed., The British Economy, p. 9 
 
It has to be noted, however, that Britain’s economy was not declining in absolute 
terms as can be seen in table 3 below. Declinism has been a recurrent theme in British politics 
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century as David Cannadine demonstrates. Britain as a 
‘nation in decline’ has been debated at length in numerous articles and has been the subject of 
various studies. An important feature was that Britain’s foreign competitors were simply 
closing the gap that had occurred after Britain’s rise in the late-18th and early-19th century. 
Cannadine mentions that ‘[d]uring the last hundred years, levels of output, income, and 
national wealth have increased unprecedentedly. Today, for most people, life in Britain is 
more rich, prosperous, varied, abundant, and secure than it was for their late Victorian 
forebears one hundred years ago.’18 He effectively puts this sense decline in perspective. 
However, constructed or not, declinism was used by the Conservatives in the 1970s to 
press the necessity of radically turning things around. They treated the economic problems 
Britain had in the 1970s not ‘as the result of conjunctural events or specific policy failings, 
but as symptoms of a profound long-term malaise in the British economy and British 
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 Cannadine, ‘Apocalypse when?’, p. 261 
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society.’ In light of this declinism, inflation became symbolic for the need of a rethinking of 
the right approach to economics. Therefore, controlling inflation would later become central 
to the Thatcherite claim that only a complete overhaul could reverse Britain’s economic 
decline.
 19
 
 
Table 3 GDP growth over 5-year periods in UK (%) 
  
Increase in  
real GDP 
(%) 
1950-55 15.2 
1955-60 13.4 
1960-65 17.5 
1965-70 13.4 
1970-75 10.8 
1975-80 9.3 
Source: R. Middleton, The British Economy Since 1945 (New York, 2000), pp. 146-47 
The 1970s and the Breakdown Consensus 
As mentioned earlier, Britain was only declining in relative terms. In absolute terms, 
Britain was experiencing economic growth since 1945, pushed by a growing world economy. 
However, at the end of the 1960s there were first signs of the British economy slowing down. 
The 1970s would turn out to be disastrous in economic terms. As can be seen in table 4, 
unemployment and especially inflation started rising during this decade.  
The abandonment of the fixed exchange rates in 1971/2 and the oil crisis of 1973 
exacerbated these effects. These events shook the foundations not just of Britain, but of the 
entire Western World according to Andrew Gamble. Managing the economy like had been 
done since the war was going to be a whole lot more difficult in the decades to come.
20
 
                                                 
19
 J. Tomlinson, ‘Thatcher, Monetarism and the Politics of Inflation’, in B. Jackson & R. Saunders ed., Making 
Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 62-77 at p. 62; Cannadine, ‘Apocalypse When?’, pp. 261-84; E.H.H 
Green, Thatcher (London, 2010), pp. 55-6 
20
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Table 4 Inflation and unemployment in the UK, 1969-1979 
  
Annual inflation 
(%) 
Total 
unemployed 
(millions) 
Unemployment 
rate of total 
labour force (%) 
1969 5.4 0.597 2.5 
1970 6.4 0.640 2.7 
1971 9.4 0.797 3.5 
1972 7.1 0.876 3.8 
1973 9.1 0.619 2.7 
1974 16.0 0.619 2.6 
1975 24.2 0.978 4.2 
1976 16.5 1.359 5.7 
1977 15.8 1.484 6.2 
1978 8.3 1.475 6.1 
1979 13.4 1.390 5.7 
Source: Middleton, British Economy, p. 149 
 
The Conservative government of Heath and the Labour government of Wilson and 
Callaghan tried to overturn this economic backlash. The former tried to reduce public 
spending and limit the government’s intervention. However, after the bankruptcy of Rolls 
Royce in 1971, he feared social disintegration which led him to abandon his radical policies 
in a famous ‘U-turn’. To make matter worse for Heath, his Industrial Relations Act – aimed 
at reforming the skew industrial relations – was rejected by trade unions. The National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) went on a twelve-week strike in 1974, leading to energy shortages 
and elective power cuts. Heath declared a state of emergency and imposed a three-day work 
week in order to save energy. He held elections in the same year, challenging Labour’s 
dependence on the unions.
21
 But after two general elections in 1974 – the first being 
indecisive – Heath was no longer Prime Minister. As the BBC documentary Margaret 
Thatcher: Prime Minister so eloquently put it: ‘a nation working under candle light was the 
final blow to Heath’s government.’22 
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 Pill & Vogel, ‘Blair Wealth Project’, p. 6 
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An agreement between the unions and the government of Labour Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson exchanged increased social benefits and greater equality for wage restraints. 
This so-called social contract was necessary in order to combat Britain’s economic problems. 
However, shop stewards started threatening their employers with wildcat strikes and obtained 
local wage increases. The social contract, which was dependent on collective bargaining on a 
national level, consequently collapsed. 
The government failed once again to reach an agreement on decreased public 
spending in 1976. Harold Wilson resigned as Prime Minister and his Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, James Callaghan, succeeded him. But neither he could turn the tide. The value of 
the British pound dropped spectacularly as international speculators lost confidence in the 
British government’s ability to curb inflation and control fiscal deficits. Callaghan turned to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to request a big loan. This led to the imposition of 
IMF reforms in 1976 in the form of an austerity plan, including the implementation of 
monetary targets and lower public spending. The consequences of this plan were lower 
inflation but higher unemployment which had passed the one million mark – which held great 
symbolic value – in 1976 as can be seen in table 4.23 At a Labour Party conference in 1976, 
Callaghan introduced the IMF-imposed reforms and denounced Keynesianism and seeing 
controlling inflation as crucial. Ironically, this would also be a central imperative of Thatcher 
a few years later.
24
 
With wage increases below inflation and public employees working near or below the 
poverty level, it led to a social conflict called the Winter of Discontent in 1978-79. It got 
sparked by the Labour government’s 5% limit on wage rises for the year in July 1978. Higher 
wage raises were not made illegal for companies, but sanctions would be made against 
companies that went over that limit. This presented many companies with a problem. Alex 
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Grover gives the example of Ford Motors. They had a good year so they could easily give 
their workers a raise of over 5%. But they were also a large government contractor. They 
decided to stick by the 5%-rule, leading promptly to an unofficial, non-union strike, two 
weeks later made legal by the Transport and General Workers Union. When Vauxhall 
Motors, a rival of Ford, gave their workers a 8.5% wage increase, Ford also gave in to the 
striker’s demands.25 The lack of collective bargaining by the trade unions demonstrated once 
more its effects. Public sector unions went on strike, demanding wage increases above the 
level of inflation. It led to images of uncollected garbage on the streets of English cities and 
even the dead were left unburied as undertakers went on strike as well. It was ‘to haunt the 
electoral chances of the Labour party and the image of the trade unions for the next 18 
years.’26 
Conclusion 
The main question asked at the beginning of this chapter was whether the economic 
situation in post-war Britain, the perception of relative decline,  and the economic and social 
crises of the 1970s had created a fertile ground for the rise of Thatcherism. Was this the case?  
According to some, the Conservatives treated the economic problems Britain had in 
the 1970s not ‘as the result of conjunctural events or specific policy failings, but as symptoms 
of a profound long-term malaise in the British economy and British society.’ In the light of 
the ‘declinist approach’, inflation became symbolic for the need of a rethinking of the right 
approach to economics. Inflation became central to the Thatcherite claim that only a complete 
overhaul could reverse Britain’s economic decline. In their 1979 manifesto the Conservatives 
claimed that inflation had come ‘near to destroying our political and social stability.’27 
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High inflation in the 1970s and the economic and social consequences in Britain had 
thus created a fertile ground for Thatcher’s rise. The Conservatives had three main problems 
to tackle: the post-war economic approach with its focus on Keynesian demand management, 
the sense of decline, and the industrial relations with the power of the trade unions.
28
 
Margaret Thatcher had focused on the disastrous consequences of inflation while in 
Opposition years before the elections of 1979, saying already in 1975 that ‘no democracy has 
survived a rate of inflation consistently higher than 20 per cent.’29 
An important aspect that led to the rise of Thatcherism, was the idea that Britain had 
become ungovernable in the 1970s, especially because of the role of the trade unions in 
bringing governments to its knees with endemic strikes, and the inability of succeeding 
governments to solve Britain’s economic problems. The post-war consensus and the post-war 
industrial relations seemed to have caused the chaos of the 1970s. Solving these problems 
seemed to require drastic reforms. Trying to battle inflation with more Keynesianism was, 
according to Thatcher, ‘like trying to cure leukaemia with leeches.’30 However, without the 
high inflation of the 1970s, their radical ideas would have fallen on deaf ears. 
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 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 8 
17 
 
Chapter 2: Thatcherism 
 
Margaret Thatcher is the topic of a substantial literature, with dozens of biographies, 
documentaries, memoirs and diaries. She was and is still very much a contested figure. Ben 
Jackson and Robert Saunders start their book Making Thatcher’s Britain by demonstrating a 
few contradictions during her political lifetime. She was the first Prime Minster to win three 
elections in a row since the Great Reform Bill of 1832, but she also was the first to be evicted 
by her own party since Neville Chamberlain. She was the most successful party leader of the 
modern era in electoral terms, but her share of the vote was smaller than any Conservative 
government since 1922 and she received fewer absolute votes than her successor, John 
Major. Lastly, she would be the first occupant of 10 Downing Street to give rise to an “-ism” 
in her lifetime, but there is ‘no agreement on what it was or who believed in it.’31 Whatever 
Thatcherism is or was, The Economist wrote a few days after her passing that ‘[s]he left 
behind a brand of politics and a set of convictions which still resonate, from Warsaw to 
Santiago to Washington.’32 
So what was this ‘brand of politics’? And even more important for this paper, how did 
the large privatisation programme of the 1980s fit into the idea of Thatcherism? After all, the 
numerous privatisations in the 11 ½ years that Mrs Thatcher was Prime Minister is seen as 
one of the defining policies of her time in office. Thatcher herself claimed that it was an 
essential part of Thatcherism’s main principles.33 However, in the Conservative Party’s 
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manifesto for the general elections of 1979, privatisation is not mentioned once and the 
nationalised industries are dealt with in one paragraph.
34
  
Even though there were some privatisations before her second term, they were 
generally industries that had only been nationalised recently. Also, the proceeds of their sale 
were relatively minor compared to later privatisations. Therefore, some authors believe that 
privatisation was only part of the ‘pure’, ‘mature’ Thatcherism of the mid- to late 1980s. This 
would assume that privatisation had a limited pre-history before her governments started 
implementing it and thus had no intrinsic link to Thatcherism.
35
  
The goal of this chapter is to try and uncover whether a connection can be drawn 
between privatisation and Thatcherism. This will mainly require a closer look at Thatcherite 
economics in order to see whether there exists a link between the earlier thoughts about 
economics and the privatisation programme of the 1980s which will be the topic of the next 
chapter. 
Thinking the Unthinkable 
The two successive general elections of 1974 were a disaster for the Conservatives. Its 
total share of the vote fell from 37.9% in February to 35.9% in October. To indicate its 
disastrous nature, the total share had not been below 40% since 1945.
36
 This meant Heath’s 
position as Tory Leader had been weakened. Because of his alleged U-turn in 1972, the 
Tory’s right wing rebelled. A likely candidate for the leadership would be the influential 
right-wing Keith Joseph. But he could not stand the pressure after a public outrage followed 
public comments he had made about poor, unmarried single girls. However, he did believe 
that Heath, who he deemed too much of a compromiser, had to go. Thatcher, who had been 
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Joseph’s unofficial campaign manager for the leadership battle, eventually took Joseph’s 
place and won, becoming Tory Leader on 11 February 1975.
37
 
According to Mrs Thatcher speaking in South-Korea in the early 1990s, she believed 
after the 1974 elections that the Conservative Party should challenge ‘socialist consensus 
politics’ instead of upholding it. According to her it had ‘retarded economic growth, 
undermined the management and competitiveness of industry and failed to bring out all that 
was best in the character of our people.’38 Thatcher’s doctrinal inclinations were linked to the 
perceived necessity of finding an alternative this Keynesian economic management.
39
 
Disillusioned with the Heath government’s economic policies, Thatcher allied herself 
with the Tory Party’s right-wing and their intellectual leader: Keith Joseph. Joseph had 
founded a new think-tank in March 1974, one month after the first Conservative electoral 
loss, and made Thatcher his vice-chairman. His aim was to ‘convert the Tory Party.’40  
Heath’s government had applied a Keynesian demand boost when the crunch came in 
1972 and 1973.  It demonstrated that the Conservative Party did not seem to have an 
alternative approach in the early 1970s to the prevailing economic orthodoxy of the time 
which argued that ‘incomes policies were necessary to combat inflation and sustain 
employment.’41 
Joseph was bent on exposing the failings of the mixed economy. The Keynesian 
consensus was making Britain the ‘poor man of Europe’ according to him. Risk taking, which 
meant rewarding success and punishing failure, had to be stimulated. Wealth creation for 
society was crucial. That meant permitting individuals to make money and build up assets. 
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Instead of subsidising employment, the government should have the generation of wealth as 
their objective.
42
 
Joseph argued that originally the Heath government had been right in their economic 
thinking, ‘but the political application of that thinking to the real economy had not been 
thought through.’ That is why it eventually fell back on Keynesian techniques. Think-tanks 
such as the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) – a free-market think-tank founded in the 
1950s – had laid the foundations of the revival of economic liberalism. Joseph wanted the 
CPS to insert economic liberalism into politics where the IEA had inserted it only in the 
intellectual community. In 1983 Alfred Sherman, the Director of Studies of the CPS between 
1975 and 1983, summarised the initial objective of the institute: ‘Our job was to question the 
unquestioned, think the unthinkable, blaze new trails.’43 
Joseph’s attack on the main feature of post-war consensus became very influential 
among right-wing Tory MPs. Joseph and the right-wing economists believed that the post-
war governments had financed welfare provision by printing money. As a result there was 
high inflation, rising to almost 25 per cent in 1974.
44
 Joseph himself explained why inflation 
was such a big problem in a speech at Preston in 1974, warning that it was threatening to 
destroy ‘the savings and plans of each person and family and the working capital of each 
business and other organization.’45 
This Preston-speech became the ‘seminal text’ of the Conservative intellectual rethink 
in the 1970s.
46
 In his speech Joseph argued that pursuing full employment was the primary 
mistake which made the country ungovernable. Instead, he believed that governments should 
pursue the controlling of the money supply so that inflation would remain low. He believed 
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that inflation was ‘largely a self-inflicted wound’, caused by governments creating new 
money and the consequent deficit financing ‘out of proportion to the additional goods and 
services available.’ In order to control inflation, public spending had to be reduced and the 
deficit had to be cut back because they were both responsible for growth of the money supply 
causing inflation.
47
 
In his thinking Joseph was influenced by the Chicago school of anti-Keynesian 
economists – Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman – and their theory called monetarism. 
This theory focused on reducing the governmental spending and especially the amount of that 
expenditure not covered by tax income: the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). 
This theory therefore provided the perfect solution for the Conservative Party in the 1970s. It 
offered the solution to prevalent incomes policies that included difficult bargaining with 
unions, because inflation could be controlled by governments acting on their own.
48
 
Bargaining with unions had caused difficulties for Heath’s government, so this solution was 
more than welcome. 
Thatcherism 
Margaret Thatcher’s years as Leader of the Opposition between 1975 and 1979 
created the theoretical framework for what some would later call the ‘Thatcherite 
Revolution’. What had to be done was working out the specific policies that an eventual 
government led by Thatcher would pursue to ‘reverse the trend of collectivism and advance 
towards a free-market political economy.’49 She personally argued that this period were the 
formative years of Thatcherism, saying about her years with the CPS and her time as Leader 
of the Opposition as starting ‘the testing process of re-thinking Conservative policy from the 
stance of the free market, limited government and the rule of law. (…) The philosophy of 
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Thatcherism, then, was born of all this personal and collective experience.’50 Nigel Lawson, 
who claimed that he coined the term Thatcherism, expanded on that definition calling it ‘a 
mixture of free markets, financial discipline, firm control over public expenditure, tax cuts, 
“Victorian values”, privatisation and a dash of populism.’51 
Thatcherism combined many ideas and political attitudes that were by no means new. 
Free trade ideology, patriotism, the attacks on the trade unions: they had all been done before 
by predecessors. It was not the originality of Thatcherism that is relevant, however, but the 
context of the 1970s and 1980s.
52
 
Eventually this new ‘brand of politics’ found fertile ground by the end of the 1970s. 
As described in the previous chapter, the combination of high inflation, the sense of decline, 
labour conflict, and social discontent had created the circumstances in which a radical shift in 
policy was possible. Keynesian demand management did not seem to offer solutions that 
could fix the country’s problems. The Winter of Discontent was the final nail in the coffin for 
the Keynesian consensus. It made the country appear ‘ungovernable’.53 
When the general elections came in 1979, the Conservatives set out five tasks in their 
manifesto. These were: 
1. To restore the health of our economic and social life, by controlling inflation and 
striking a fair balance between the rights and duties of the trade union movement. 
2. To restore incentives so that hard work pays, success is rewarded and genuine new 
jobs are created in an expanding economy. 
3. To uphold Parliament and the rule of law. 
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4. To support family life, by helping people to become home-owners, raising the 
standards of their children's education, and concentrating welfare services on the 
effective support of the old, the sick, the disabled and those who are in real need. 
5. To strengthen Britain's defences and work with our allies to protect our interests in an 
increasingly threatening world.
54
 
It is not surprising that the Conservatives put controlling inflation as their first task. In the 
previous chapter it became clear that they saw it as one of the main reasons for Britain’s 
economic problems. Despite prior Conservative governments having given bringing down 
inflation a high priority, they had ‘not developed a coherent doctrine about its causes or how 
to combat it.’55 
Rolling Back the State Frontiers 
An recurrent theme in the debate about Thatcherism is individual freedom and the 
role of state. In her foreword to the 1979 manifesto, Margaret Thatcher expresses that 
especially individual freedom and the reverse of decline were in the balance at the upcoming 
elections, saying that ‘the balance of our society has been increasingly tilted in favour of the 
State at the expense of individual freedom.’56 
The Conservative Party blamed Labour for many things that were wrong in Britain in 
1979. One of the major accusations was that, according to the Conservatives, Labour had 
been responsible for enlarging the role of the state at the expense of the individual, crippling 
enterprise in the process. The Conservatives claimed that they could halt the relative decline 
that was occurring in Britain, claiming that the ‘country's relative decline is not inevitable,’ 
and that the way to do it is ‘helping people to help themselves.’ It would seem that the basis 
of Thatcherism was ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state in order to enlarge the space for 
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private enterprise, competition, and individual liberty.’57 As she told House of Commons in 
1983 that she had a vision of ‘long-term economic growth’ that was based on the creation of 
an ‘enterprise culture’.58  
In a 1987 interview with a German magazine, Thatcher argued that ‘[t]he 
management of property, whether it is a home, whether it is your shares or savings, building 
your own security for the future, brings a sense of responsibility … that is what Thatcherism 
is.’59 The goal was to free the economy from the ‘dead hand of the State’ so individuals 
would be able to exercise their talents to the full and thereby make them responsible for their 
own fate. Rolling back the frontiers of the State meant that individuals had to be free and not 
depend on others ‘in the form of taxpayer-subsidized industries or benefits. Reducing the 
scale of State activity and giving more scope to the individual, providing incentives for effort 
through cutting the level of personal taxation, encouraging people to acquire and pass on 
property in the form of houses and equities, all established a link between economic freedom 
and the ability to exercise and fulfil personal choice.’60  
These goals could only be achieved, according to Thatcher, by ‘rolling back the 
frontiers of the State’ both in the economic sphere as the social sphere. However, the state 
would provide a strong defence and also enfore law and order. Gamble calls this part the 
concept of the ‘strong State’ complemented by the ‘free economy.’61 Therefore a ‘private-
sector-dominated market economy’ had to replace the current mixed economy. This involved 
lowering direct taxation, reforming and reducing the welfare state, encouraging wider 
property ownership, trade unions and other institutions that ‘hampered the operation of the 
market’ had to be curbed, and finally, low inflation should be the main goal of economic 
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policy. ‘In short, Thatcherism sought to dismantle the policy structures that had come to be 
defined as the ‘post-war settlement’ or the post-war consensus.’62 
Critical Views  
When one reads about Thatcherism, it becomes clear that there is no single 
uncontested meaning. Many commentators even doubt if Thatcherism is an actual coherent 
ideology. Jim Bulpitt sees Thatcher predominantly as ‘statecraft’, ‘designed primarily as an 
experiment in government survival rather than in economic or political theory,’ dismissing 
the ideological side of Thatcherism as of secondary importance and also the monetarist 
objectives such as ‘the revival of the free market, individual initiative, rolling back the 
frontiers of the state, public expenditure cuts, and above all, the defeat of inflation’ as inferior 
to statecraft.
63
  
Peter Riddell also does not see Thatcherism as an ideology. Instead, he sees it as 
‘essentially an instinct, a series of moral values and an approach to leadership rather than an 
ideology. It is an expression of Mrs Thatcher’s upbringing in Grantham, her background of 
hard work and family responsibility, ambition and postponed satisfaction, duty and 
patriotism.’ He sees ‘consistency’ as the striking feature of her approach with recurrent 
themes such as personal responsibility, the family and national pride. He adds that her 
references to Victorian values are exemplary for Thatcher’s rhetoric.64  
Just like other -isms, Thatcherism is not an explanation in itself but it does ‘identify 
phenomena that are coherent enough to warrant further investigation.’ Gamble believes that 
Thatcherism is particularly relevant for understanding events after 1975, because ‘Thatcher 
identified herself with the ideas and the causes of the New Right and used her position as 
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leader to promote the spread of these ideas in a manner that was highly unusual for a 
Conservative leader.’65 
That means that whether or not Thatcherism was an ideology, her consistency in 
spreading certain core principles is what is relevant. As can be seen in the manifesto’s five 
primary tasks, these had been consistent from the mid-1970s until 1979. In my opinion, 
therefore, Thatcherism was at least a coherent set of ideas especially about the role of the 
state, individual freedom and personal responsibility. 
Conclusion 
Large volumes have been written about Thatcher and Thatcherism. Most authors seem 
to agree that she had a lasting impact and that she profoundly changed British society and 
economy, either for the worse or for the better. The attention this so-called ‘revolution’ has 
received, is demonstrated by the numerous books and articles about this ‘Thatcher 
Revolution’.66 
Her intent was to break radically with the status quo. Evans sees Thatcherism as the 
antitheses of everything that the Thatcherites thought was wrong what they believed to be the 
Keynesian consensus. It was against too much state intervention, therefore in favour of 
individual rights. It was against state initiatives that encourage a dependency on the state, 
therefore in favour of private enterprise within a free market. It was against consensus-
politics, therefore in favour of firm leadership. It was against high levels of taxation, 
therefore in favour of low levels of taxation. It was against the distorting of market forces by 
both organised labour and entrenched professional interests, therefore in favour of reforming 
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trade unions. It was against the declining reputation of Britain in the world, therefore in 
favour of simple patriotism.
67
 
One of the central arguments of Thatcher was that government should not be in 
business. She may not have said it explicitly before 1979, but to me privatisation is a logical 
consequence of that thought. However, she was also a pragmatic politician and aware of the 
difficulties both economically and politically of rushing into a large privatisation programme. 
De-nationalising recently nationalised industries was not necessarily the problem. But some 
State-owned industries, for example the phone system, had never existed under private 
ownership. These first had to be rationalised before they could be sold off. Also, there was no 
clear blueprint for this because it never had been done before anywhere. It required planning 
and careful consideration. 
Lastly, Thatcherism may or may not be an ideology, it had been consistent all 
throughout the 1970s. It was coherent set of ideas focusing particularly on the role of the 
state, individual freedom and personal responsibility. 
This chapter thus demonstrates that although Thatcherism did not explicitly have 
privatisation or denationalisation as a primary goal before 1979, its ideas concerning the role 
of the state in the market were in the same line of thought. Privatisation, therefore was 
intrinsically connected to the core ideas of Thatcherism. 
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Chapter 3: Privatisation 
 
Although most people associate modern privatisation programmes with Margaret 
Thatcher, her government was not the first to try privatisation. In the first years of Heath’s 
government, the Conservatives tried to implement a denationalisation programme. However, 
Heath’s aforementioned U-turn in that government’s economic policy killed the programme 
rapidly.
68
  Outside Britain the Adenauer Government in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Chilean government under Pinochet tried large-scale, ideologically motivated 
‘denationalisation’ programmes after 1945. However, both programmes failed and the 
denationalised companies had to be re-nationalised some time later. It was Britain under 
Thatcher that started the trend of large-scale privatisation programmes and was therefore the 
most important historically.
69
 
Before Thatcher’s privatisation programme is analysed, there needs to be defined 
what privatisation actually means. William Megginson and Jeffrey Netter define the political 
and economic policy of privatisation as ‘the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) or assets to private economic agents.’70 This definition will be the one 
used for this chapter. 
To understand the link between Thatcherism and privatisation, it is necessary to 
understand how privatisation actually took place. The impact of the privatisation programme 
can only be analysed if it is clear what the programme actually was.  
To analyse the privatisation programme and its consequences, this chapter will be 
split up in five sections. The first section will be a short history of the state-owned enterprises 
                                                 
68
 R. Rees, ‘Economic Aspects of Privatization in Britain’ in V. Wright, Privatization in Western Europe 
(London, 1994), pp. 44-56 at p. 44 
69
 W.L. Megginson & J.M. Netter, ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1 June 2001), pp. 321-389 at p. 323; G. Roland ed., 
Privatization: Successes and Failures (New York, 2008), p. 10 
70
 Megginson & Netter, ‘From State to Market’, p. 321 
29 
 
(SOEs). It will partly clarify the main motivations for privatisation between 1979 and 1990. 
The second section will discuss Thatcher’s main economic policies and the British economy 
in general during the period 1979-90. Privatisation was part of a broader vision Thatcherites 
had of Britain. Therefore privatisation cannot be singled out without mentioning other 
economic policies. Also, the effects of the British economy and the world economy on policy 
decisions were important. The third section will be about Thatcher’s privatisation programme 
between 1979 and 1990. When were the first initial ideas about privatisation formulated? 
How did they proceed and how was the programme actually implemented? The fifth section 
will be the consequences of the privatisation on Britain and the rest of the world. The sixth 
section will summarise and conclude this chapter. 
The Nationalised Industries 
Megginson and Netter argue in their survey of empirical studies on privatisation that 
the argument for a more active role of governments around the world, ‘including ownership 
of production and provision of all types of goods and services’, was a consequence of the 
Depression, World War II and the final breakup of colonial empires. In Western Europe there 
was a debate as to how deeply involved the State should be in regulating the domestic 
economy and which industries should be owned exclusively by the State. Until 1979 the 
prevailing answer, not just in Britain but elsewhere as well, was that the State should at least 
control the telecommunications, postal services, electric and gas utilities, and most forms of 
non-road transportation such as airlines and railroads. There was also a widespread belief 
among many politicians that the state should control certain strategic manufacturing 
industries – the ‘commanding heights’ – steel and defence production for example.71 
In Britain’s case, the nationalisation of certain industries started in July 1945 when the 
Labour Party of Clement Attlee won the elections. One of their primary objectives was the 
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nationalisation of major industries and taking control of the commanding heights of the 
economy. Coal, iron and steel, utilities, and some other major firms were nationalised under 
this government. They thought the government was better at controlling the economy than the 
market forces. The general idea was that nationalisation would lead to better operation of 
firms, full employment and growth. Added to that was the hope that government-ownership 
would lead to a fairer allocation of resources. In 1946 20% of the British workforce was 
employed in SOEs.
72
 
Under the Conservative Party, who were the governmental party between 1951 and 
1964, there was not a large denationalisation programme. Only the steel industry was 
returned to the private sector. The latter was re-nationalised once more under Labour. In the 
1970s Labour Government there was a more interventionist stance to industry and brought 
several more industries and even single enterprises into public ownership. In 1979 the public 
corporation in the British economy represented 10.5% of total GDP and 8.1% of the labour 
force.
73
 
Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1982 and 1989 and therefore 
one of the main protagonists of Thatcher’s privatisation programme, gave several reasons 
why he believed that nationalisation had failed. First, he believed that the nationalised 
industries actually turned out to be the ‘biggest threat to industrial peace’ due to the 
combination of strong central union power and the safety-net of the Treasury. Second, the 
goal of full employment had led to overmanning and consequently greater job losses in the 
long term.
74
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He added two other main criticisms that were on the arguments that nationalisation 
led to an increase in productivity and a more efficient regulation of monopolies. About the 
former, he mentioned that private enterprises were performing better than their nationalised 
counterparts based on a report by a former-advocate-turned-critic of nationalised industries in 
the late 1970s, Richard Pryke.
75
 His main conclusion was that ‘they had used capital and 
labour less effectively than their private counterparts, and were operating at a loss.’ Lawson 
added that public ownership eliminates the necessary ‘threat of take-over and ultimately 
bankruptcy, and the need, which all private undertakings have from time to time, to raise 
money from the market.’ Lawson saw the regulation of monopoly argument as neglecting the 
advantages of introducing competition.
76
 
The ‘politicisation’ was another threat of state-owned companies according to 
Lawson. Politicians in power drove the firm’s decision, not their managers. This involved 
decisions regarding wage increases, the location of new plants, acquiring new equipment, and 
other major projects. Lawson argued in his 1982 speech that what was missing, was the 
discipline of the market. ‘What public ownership does is to eliminate the threat of take-over 
and ultimately bankruptcy, and the need, which all private undertakings have from time to 
time, to raise money from the market.’77 
Dunkerly and Hare give five reasons why nationalisation eventually failed. First, the 
model of nationalisation assumed that changing ownership would solve problems, not 
looking to the specific nature of the problems involved. Second, government intervention 
weakened the industry’s incentives to produce efficiently and produce good services leading 
to lower productivity. Third, each industry made its own demand, cost, and investment 
forecast without coordinating it with the other SOEs. There was a low degree of planning 
which could have ensured ‘reasonably well coordinated development in the absence of 
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market signals which are supposed to achieve such coordination in the private sector.’ Fourth, 
the model became a ‘kind of dogma’, applying virtually the same model for nationalisations 
in the 1960s and 1970s as for the industries nationalised directly after the war, although these 
industries had different problems. Fifth, the industrial relations had serious shortcomings. 
Workers were put in an adversarial role to management in bargaining about wages and 
conditions. This worked well enough when the public sector was growing, but if economic 
pressure forced management to cut jobs, this was met with fierce opposition as can be seen in 
chapter 1. Dunkerly and Hare conclude that the approach to nationalisation ‘eventually ran 
against an increasing number of serious difficulties which could not be resolved merely by 
tinkering with the established model. This model has had its day.’78 
Thatcherite Economic Policies 
After the elections of 1979 the Conservatives had received 43.9 % of the total votes 
and won 339 seats in total – an increase of 62 seats. They gained an overall majority over all 
other parties of 43 seats due to the First-Past-The-Post system.
79
 The first Thatcher 
Administration came into office. 
The first budget in 1979 had two primary objectives: reduce inflation and restructure 
the tax burden. Inflation would be brought down by a severe monetary and fiscal squeeze. 
The tax structure would be reformed so income taxes were brought down, especially for 
higher incomes, while the value-added tax was nearly doubled. This shift from taxing 
spending instead of income had the objective to ‘widen choice and improve incentives.’ 
Other crucial measures were the announcement of new money-supply targets, a pledge to 
reduce the PSBR, raising the minimum lending-rate, and cutting back on public 
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expenditure.
80
 The first phase of Thatcher’s government was dominated by the consequences 
of the government’s determination to maintain a strict monetary policy in order to bring down 
inflation. The conquest of inflation was the government’s top priority.’81 
In line with the philosophy of Thatcherism, the first Thatcher Administration 
attempted to create a thriving enterprise economy. Riddell mentions that the government had 
shown ‘an almost moral fervour about its desire to extol the entrepreneur, to roll back the 
state, to sell off public corporations and to change the whole climate in which business 
operates.’ The goal was a cultural change to recreate the conditions of the nineteenth century 
that led to the rise of Britain’s commerce and industry.82 Crafts and Woodward added that 
they thought that deregulation and instilling more competition in financial markets was the 
emphasis of Thatcher’s economic policy. This was in direct opposition to the preceding years 
when the government’s intent had been getting efficient allocation of resources which was 
supposed to result in a much more rapid rate of financial innovation.
83
 
Several key agencies and institutions that had been responsible for intervening in the 
economy previously were abolished. The government instead placed ‘its faith in the private 
sector and the removal of obstacles to the workings of free markets.’ Symbolic for the move 
towards the achievement of economic freedom was the abolition of restrictions on the import 
and export of capital in July and October of 1979.
84
 
As described in chapter 1, the power of the trade unions and shop stewards were very 
significant on industrial relations after the war. A number of  Trade Union Acts under 
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Thatcher were focused on rolling back their influence. For example, the government made 
secondary picketing virtually impossible and it made an end to the infamous closed shops.
85
 
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which was the traditional elite of the 
trade unions and had been responsible for the Heath government’s downfall in 1974, would 
eventually start a strike against these governmental policies. Unlike in 1974, this time the 
government was prepared for a long strike of the NUM. Learning from the Heath 
government, the government made sure that an eventual strike would not lead to power 
shortages by stockpiling coal in advance and assuring imports of energy if it would be 
needed. Economically it made sense as well, because the nationalised coal industry was 
losing money and proved to be a drain on governmental subsidies. It required drastic 
rationalisation, mines would have to close and the workforce would have to shrink. However, 
the NUM turned it into a class-war.
86
 
The strike started in 1984 and lasted a year. It eventually failed in 1985 for several 
reasons, one of which was the refusal of the NUM president, Arthur Scargill, to hold a secret 
ballot before calling the strike, which damaged the strike’s legitimacy in the public’s eyes. 
After the strike was defeated, the national coal mining industry shrank drastically. It was a 
monumental victory for Thatcher, effectively breaking the influence of the unions reinforced 
after another major strike of print workers was defeated in 1986. The total number of trade 
unionists in Britain fell from 13.5 million in 1979 to about 10.5 million in 1986, and went 
under the 10 million mark when Thatcher left office in 1990. ‘Margaret Thatcher appeared to 
have slain another of her dragons.’87 
It is also important to realise that Britain was very much affected by the world 
economy. Gamble connects Thatcher’s time in office to distinct phases in the world 
economy, more or less coinciding with her three terms. The first period was between 1979 
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and 1982 and was during a worldwide slump in the world economy after a rise in oil prices in 
1979. High interest rates and the increased oil prices led to an increase of the sterling by 12%. 
British companies thus saw their competitive position decline dramatically while profits and 
liquidity became tighter. It led to numerous bankruptcies, plant closures and lay-offs. 
Unemployment and inflation were both soaring. In 1982 the recovery started, mainly because 
of the United States’ trade and budget deficits. This boom lasted until 1987 when the stock-
market crashed in 1987. Gamble blames this collapse on the unsustainable growth of debt, 
leading to high inflation.
88
 
The Privatisation Programme 
In previous chapter it has been mentioned that Thatcher claimed that one of the main 
principles of Thatcherism was the privatisation of industry in order to roll back the frontiers 
of the state. She ‘believed that private property should be spread as widely as possible, as a 
bulwark for the liberty and independence of the people and to enhance a sense of 
responsibility to future generations.’89 As described in the previous chapter, however, 
privatisation or denationalisation was barely mentioned in the 1979 manifesto. Therefore, 
several authors have portrayed the privatisation programme as a ‘product of the “pure” or 
“mature” Thatcherism of the mid- to late 1980s.’90  
That does not tell the whole story though. In task two of the five tasks set out in the 
1979 manifesto (see chapter 2) there are some signs that privatisation was indeed part of the 
Thatcherite agenda though not explicitly. A phrase directly from the manifesto states: ‘We all 
hope that those firms which are at present being helped by the taxpayer will soon be able to 
succeed by themselves; but success or failure lies in their own hands.’ It is followed by a 
statement that they oppose Labour’s plans to nationalise more firms and actually mention 
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selling back to private ownership the recently nationalised aerospace and shipbuilding 
firms.
91
 Furthermore, they already announced that they aimed to sell shares in the National 
Freight Corporation to the general public in order to achieve substantial private investment in 
it. Also, a large part of task two focuses on profits being the ‘foundation of a free enterprise 
economy’, seeing effective competition as a solution to low profits.92 
The Conservatives explained why they should not rush into radical economic reform 
straight away  in a 1977 paper called The Right Approach to the Economy. This document 
was the only official document published regarding Conservative policy between February 
1975, when Thatcher became Tory leader, and the 1979 manifesto.
93
 Amongst the writers 
were prominent Tories including Sir Keith Joseph and Geoffrey Howe who would later 
become Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the paper they presented a broad outline of the next 
Conservative’s government economic strategy. They argued for introducing more 
competition into the economy and ‘removing other barriers to enterprise.’ They add, 
however, that they understand that industrialists require stability and therefore would not 
want to ‘rush into major institutional changes.’94 In my opinion, large-scale privatisation 
programme would be considered a major institutional change. 
Most nationalised industries could not just be privatised. They first had to be ‘fixed’ 
in order to be able to sell them in the first place. This meant reducing their loss-making 
activities, restructuring their organisation, and establishing a basis for profitability. To 
demonstrate the approach of the government regarding this problem, Yergin and Stanislaw 
use the example of British Steel. From the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s this company lost 
billions of pounds which had to be covered by the Treasury. Restructuring was therefore 
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necessary in order to stop its drain on public funds. By the time British Steel was finally 
privatised, ‘its labor force had already been drastically reduced and its productivity 
dramatically increased, its facilities rationalized. And it was profitable- and internationally 
competitive.’95 Yergin and Stanislaw argue that restructuring the SOEs before selling was 
also crucial ‘since governments are better able than private owners to cushion the financial 
blow to any displaced workers by using unemployment or pension schemes.’ It would let the 
private buyers of SOEs start with a ‘clean slate’. In Britain, preparing companies for 
privatisation was standard practice during the 1980s, ‘in part to smooth the transition with the 
trade unions.’96 
The first explicit mentioning of a large-scale privatisation programme was in 1981. 
On 19 October of that year, Nigel Lawson, at his first appearance as Energy Secretary, 
announced to a ‘surprised’ House of Commons the intention of privatising the entire 
businesses of British Gas and the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC). Two months 
later he elaborated on this initial statement: ‘No industry should remain under State 
ownership unless there is a positive and overwhelming case for it doing so. Inertia is not 
enough. As a nation we simply cannot afford it.’97  
As for the actual implementation of the privatisation programme, Pill and Vogel state 
that it happened in three phases. The first phase involved the more obvious and competitive 
sectors and companies such as Amersham International, Cable and Wireless and British 
Aerospace. In the second phase, the commanding heights were privatised, including steel, 
coal and shipbuilding. Third and last were the privatisations of the utilities such as electricity 
and water.
98
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These were the objectives that were set by the Conservatives for the British privatisation 
programme:
99
 
1. Raise revenue for the State 
2. Promote economic efficiency 
3. Reduce government interference in the economy 
4. Promote wider share ownership 
5. Provide the opportunity to introduce competition 
6. Subject SOEs to market discipline 
 
The first actual privatisations, meaning the selling of state assets, began on 19 June 1979 
when the National Enterprise Board was ordered to sell over £100 million worth of assets. 
Also, the BNOC had to give up its interests in oil exploration, including selling its 23 blocks 
in the North Sea.
100
 The recently nationalised Cable & Wireless and British Aerospace were 
both privatised in 1981. Other examples of early privatisations were roadside gas stations and 
hotels belonging to the state-owned railway system. However, the sale of council housing 
units to its tenants turned out to be the most significant form of privatisation in the early 
Thatcher years due to its popularity.
101
 It led to 40% of council house owners voting for 
Thatcher in 1983 while only 25% of council house tenants did that.
102
 Privatisation got a 
good reputation in the public opinion. 
Objective four, promoting wider share ownership among the population, became very 
important for the Thatcher government. Nigel Lawson mentioned that ‘widespread ownership 
of private property is crucial to the survival of freedom and democracy.’103  
Very important in that objective of achieving this ‘capital-owning democracy’ was the 
privatisation of the state telephone system into British Telecom in November 1984. It was 
symbolic for the shifting balance from production to the consumer in the economy and would 
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be considered the real breakthrough for privatisation. The attention was a lot more dramatic 
for the privatisation of the phone system, because it affected consumers much more than the 
gas and oil privatisations.
104
 
However, a more important reason was the fact that the success of the initial public 
offering of British Telecom led to privatisation by public share offering becoming a standard 
model. It was a major success with 2.3 million people buying shares and a total revenue 
raised of almost £4 billion, dwarfing all the privatisations that had gone before. It led to 
increasingly massive share issue privatisations (SIPs) through public share offering in the 
second half of the 1980s and early 1990s as can be seen in table 5. It reduced the role of 
SOEs in Britain’s economy to essentially nothing when the Conservatives left office in 1997, 
from more than 10% of GDP when they came into office in 1979.
105
  
There was also opposition to privatisation from the press, parts of the public, trade unions 
within SOEs and also from managers of those companies. An example was an attempt in 
1981 to sell the nine hundred showrooms British Gas owned that held the exclusive right to 
sell gas-fired stoves and other appliances. This decision was met with heavy protests. An 
alliance of Labour and even some Conservative MPs with British Gas’s unions ‘egged on by 
management that did not want to lose any of its empire’ managed to portray this sale as an 
assault on the British way of life. Lawson did not expect this strong opposition, so he had to 
back down for now.
106
 This episode demonstrated that privatisation was not a battle easily 
won. 
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Table 5 Privatisation by public share offering, 1981-1991 
 
 
Another issue with privatisation was the problem of selling assets which were 
strategically important such as oil. These could not end up in foreign hands. Lawson therefore 
created a ‘golden share’ when the government sold more than 51% in one of these industries. 
This special share would be retained by the Government after privatisation and would retain a 
‘quite disproportionate power.’ This way they could ‘prevent control of the company from 
falling into unsuitable hands,’ mainly meaning foreign hands. 107 This would become the 
standard for privatisation of certain strategic assets.
108
 
The protests against privatisation eventually died down. In their general election 
manifesto for the 1983 elections, Labour still promised ‘the return to public ownership of 
those public industries sold off by the Tories,’ wanting to bring Britoil and British Petroleum 
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Month Year Company 
Equity 
initially sold 
(%) 
Proceeds 
(millions of 
pounds) 
Feb 
1981 
British Aerospace 51.6 150 
Oct Cable and Wireless 50 224 
Feb 
1982 
Amersham International 100 71 
Nov Britoil 51 549 
Feb 1983 Associated British Ports 51.5 22 
June 
1984 
Enterprise Oil 100 382 
July Jaguar 99 294 
Nov British Telecom 50.2 3,916 
Dec 1986 British Gas 97 5,434 
Feb 
1987 
British Airways 100 900 
May Rolls-Royce 100 1,363 
July British Airports Authority 100 1,281 
Dec 1988 British Steel 100 2,500 
Dec 1989 Regional Water Companies 100 5,110 
Dec 1990 
Electricity Distribution 
Companies 
100 5,092 
Mar 
1991 
National Power and PowerGen 60 2,230 
May 
Scottish Power and 
Scottish Hydro Electric 
100 2,880 
Total    
32,398 
Source: Pill & Vogel, 'Blair Wealth Project', p. 21 
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back under public control.
109
 In their 1987 manifesto, however, Labour did not mention re-
nationalisation or public ownership at all. They only opposed further privatisation of the NHS 
and public utilities such as water and electricity.
110
 Privatisation had become a fact. 
Consequences of Privatisation 
A major criticism on privatisation comes from Evans who believed that the enhanced 
productivity of the privatised firms was because the CEOs had made them ‘leaner’ and ‘fitter’ 
by reducing the workforce.
111
 However, the largest increases in unemployment happened 
before the major privatisations of the second half of the 1980s and could be blamed on the 
global recession.
112
 Also, nationalised industries had been instrumental in previously 
government’s policies in pursuing full employment, leading to overmanning of these 
companies. Rationalising the workforce was done prior to privatisation, but was necessary in 
order to make them more efficient and in the end profitable. In the 1987 manifesto the 
Conservatives condemned returning to the ‘overmanning practices’ of the 1970s.113 
It was expected that privatisation would lead to increased performance of the 
privatised companies. Stephen Martin and David Parker have done several studies on the 
effects of privatisation on the performance of eleven British companies privatised during the 
period 1981-88 and analysing the changes in several features of the companies over the 
course of privatisation.
114
 These were the rate of return on capital employed, annual growth in 
value-added per employee-hour, labour productivity growth and total factor productivity 
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growth. The outcome was mixed. Half of the studied firms did not have outright performance 
improvements after privatisation. They highlight the run-up to privatisation as most 
influential on improvements in performance, leading to the conclusion that the ‘threat’ or 
‘opportunity’ of privatisation may lead to improved performance because it ‘gels 
management’. It also demonstrates that performance improvement is possible under public 
ownership ‘when the incentive and will exist.’ These mixed results confirm for them that 
‘privatisation does not guarantee good performance.’115  
However, Megginson and Netter come to a different conclusion. They surveyed 22 
different studies about the impact of privatisation via public share offering on performance 
and employment in developed countries. Their conclusion is that, except for one, they all 
‘offer at least limited support for the proposition that privatization is associated with 
improvements in the operating and financial performance of divested firms,’ adding that ‘all 
studies that examine post-privatization changes in output, efficiency, profitability, capital 
investment spending and leverage document significant increases in the first four and 
significant declines in leverage.’ They add that the studies are not unanimous regarding the 
impact privatisation has on employment levels. According to them, privatisation does not 
necessarily lead to unemployment due to employment reduction in privatised companies, 
‘though this will likely occur unless sales can increase fast enough after divestiture to offset 
very large productivity gains.’116 
Pill and Vogel explain these different findings by explaining that it was not 
privatisation per se that led to an increase of performance and productivity, but rather the 
introduction of competition into markets. In some cases in Britain, as for example the 
utilities, competition was only introduced ten years after privatisation. That would explain 
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why there was no immediate impact after privatisation.
117
 Most of the times privatisation 
programmes were accompanied by a changed corporate governance system which spurred on 
competition in the market.  
An important incentive for governments to privatise SOEs was raising funds. In 
Britain, a total of £45 billion worth of state assets were sold involving telecommunications, 
manufacturing, transport and energy industries between 1979 and the early 1990s.
118
 These 
revenues were welcome, because they could fund other economic imperatives such as tax 
cuts and increased social benefits due to high unemployment. 
One of Thatcher’s main objectives for her privatisation programme was increasing the 
number of individual shareholders in Britain, intended to draw out the public’s 
entrepreneurial spirit.
119
 Thatcher’s dream was creating ‘popular capitalism’. 
Through privatisation – particularly of privatisation which leads to the widest possible 
share ownership by members of the public – the state’s power is reduced and the 
power of the people enhanced. (…) Privatisation is at the centre of any programme of 
reclaiming territory for freedom.
120
  
 
The number of these individual shareholders had risen between 1980 and 1990 from 3 
to 11 million, more than there were members of trade unions. However, 54% of these people 
held shares in just one single company and 20% only in two. This meant that 26 per cent held 
shares in three or more companies which is less than 3 million. Simultaneously, institutional 
ownership – shares owned by large financial organisations, pension funds, hedge funds etc. – 
had increased over the 1980s from 72% to 79%. The limitations of Thatcher’s ideal of a 
‘capital-owning democracy’ were clearly visible. Shareholder meetings of the privatised 
utilities were exemplary for this. ‘On these occasions critical small shareholders were very 
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numerous and, as individual voters, were always in the majority, but they were outweighed 
by the votes cast by institutions.’121 
Another major consequence for the British economy was the shrinking of the public 
sector and the growing of the private sector. By the general election of 1992, roughly two 
thirds of formerly SOEs in the UK had been privatised. This comprised about 46 major 
companies.
122
 As can be seen in table 6 below, at the end of Thatcher’s term the private 
sector provided employment for 3 million more people than before. Self-employed increased 
by a factor of over 1.5 in that same period. It is also noteworthy that not only did the 
nationalised industries provide less jobs, also the public sector shrunk by 1.5 million in terms 
of employment. 
 
Table 6 Employment in different sectors, 1979-90 
 
Private 
sector 
Self- 
employed 
Public 
sector 
Nationalised 
industries 
1979 17.9 1.9 7.5 1.9 
1982 16.9 2.2 7.0 1.6 
1985 17.8 2.6 6.6 1.1 
1988 19.3 3.0 6.3 0.8 
1990 20.9 3.3 6.0 0.7 
Source: Cook & Stevenson, Britain since 1945, p. 170 
 
In my opinion the most important consequence for Britain was the altered role of the 
state vis-à-vis the economy. Privatisation was the highlight of this new focus on the supply-
side of the economy, meaning the government’s main task was creating a framework 
favourable for enterprises to flourish. Amongst others, this led to drastically decreased 
income taxes, especially over corporation taxes and tax rates for higher incomes which 
declined from respectively 83% and 98% in 1978 to both 40% in 1990.
123
 Also, especially 
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after the start of the major privatisations at the end of 1984, there was a steady decline of 
public spending.
124
  
The Economist, writing in an article on the day she passed away that ‘[h]er 
enthusiasm for privatisation launched a global revolution.’125 But what was this revolution 
The Economist had perceived? The perceived success of Britain’s privatisation programme 
led to other countries following its example and began full-scale privatisation programmes 
themselves. In France, Jacques Chirac privatised 22 companies, worth a total of $12 billion* 
between 1986 and 1988. In the 1990s these privatisations continued after a small break where 
a Socialist government was in charge. Other European governments – including Italy, 
Germany and Spain – started privatisation programmes in the 1990s. Most of these were done 
in the form of public share offerings. Privatisation soon spread to other parts of the world, 
especially Latin American countries and the former Soviet-bloc countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Megginson and Netter argue that privatisation was so popular and spread to 
all parts of the world so rapidly because ‘governments have found the lure of revenue from 
sales of SOEs to be attractive.’126 The cumulative value of these worldwide proceeds in the 
1990s was almost $1 trillion as can be seen in table 7.* 
Megginson and Netter have collected data from other papers and discovered that the 
role of SOEs in the economies of high-income countries has declines from 8.5% of GDP in 
1984 to less than 6% in 1991. This decline has continued since 1991 and they argue that at 
the time of their writing in 2001, it was probably below 5%. The low- and middle-income 
countries experienced an even sharper decline in public ownership. The former’s SOE share 
of GDP has dropped from a high point of 16% to barely 7% in 1995 and has continues to 
                                                 
124
 The Guardian website, How Britain changed under Margaret Thatcher in 15 charts (8 April 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/datablog/2013/apr/08/britain-changed-margaret-thatcher-charts (accessed 13 
April 2013) 
125
 The Economist , Margaret Thatcher: The Lady who changed the World (8 April 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2013/04/margaret-thatcher (accessed 12 June 2013) 
* 1995 dollars 
126
 Megginson & Netter, ‘From State to Market’, p. 324-26 
46 
 
drop since then. However, the middle-income countries’ decline of SOE share was most 
severe, because it comprised the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. For 
example, the Czechoslovakian government owned 98% of all property in 1989.
127
 
 
 
Table 7 Total global privatisation proceeds in the 1990s 
  
Total amount 
raised  
(US $ million) 
Percentage of 
global total 
OECD countries 655,680 70.0% 
Of which EU-countries 420,564 44.9% 
Non-OECD countries 280,962 30.0% 
   Global total 936,642 100.0% 
Source: Parker & Saal ed., International Handbook on Privatization, p. 5 
 
A dramatic impact of privatisation was on the development of capital markets. The 
increase in market capitalisation and trading volumes of shares in the 1980s and 1990s has 
been impressive. In Britain the market capitalisation in 2001-US dollars increased from $83 
billion in 1983 to over $1 trillion in 1992. Worldwide market capitalisations increased tenfold 
from $3.4 trillion in 1983 to $35 trillion in 1999. The total value of shares traded increased 
more than nine times in Britain from $42 billion in 1983 to $383 billion in 1992. Worldwide 
this was even more impressive, from $1.2 trillion in 1983 to $37.5 trillion in 1999. This trend 
not only occurred in developed countries, but underdeveloped countries as well. The 
development of efficient capital markets have been proven to ‘promote economic growth and 
allow individual firms to fund investment opportunities they otherwise would have to forgo.’ 
An additional consequence of these large-scale privatisation programmes were that they 
spurred modernisation of a nation’s corporate governance system.128 
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Conclusion 
Thatcher’s economic policies all had one objective in common: rolling back the 
frontiers of the state and let the free market forces play. In the 1970s the nationalised 
industries had demonstrated their inefficiency and inflation was damaging the country. Trade 
unions were blocking the play of free market forces. Regulation and several governmental 
institutions were intervening too much in the economy. These problems had to be solved in 
order to reach the goal of a free economy. Privatisation proved particularly valuable, because 
it not only reduced the role of the state in the economy, it also had the additional benefit of 
being able to finance the tax and public spending cuts. The fact that the world economy 
started a recovery period from 1982 onwards and military victory in the Falklands War 
secured Thatcher’s position. 
Privatisation could not happen overnight. The Conservatives had even admitted 
earlier in the paper, The Right Approach, that major institutional changes would be done 
gradually. Also, before the SOEs could be privatised, they first had to be ‘prepared’ for the 
private sector. The argument that privatisation was only part of a later-Thatcherism is 
therefore invalid. 
An important objective of the privatisation was creating a capital-owning democracy. 
This objective influenced the method of privatisation which happened mostly through public 
share offering, especially after the successful SIP of British Telecom in 1984. The concept of 
widespread ownership of private property fits into one of the pillars of Thatcherism: the focus 
on the free individual and a smaller state. Therefore it could be said that the way privatisation 
was executed, is intrinsically linked to Thatcherism’s goals of creating a thriving enterprise 
economy where individual freedom is paramount and the role of the state drastically reduced. 
In my opinion, the most important consequence of privatisation within Britain was 
how it reshaped the economy. It irreversibly led to a new thinking about the relation between 
48 
 
the state and the economy that  ‘New Labour’ did not alter under Tony Blair and which is still 
dominant in Britain today.
129
 In that regard, Thatcher’s economic policy in general and her 
privatisation programme in particular represented a radical break with the post-war consensus 
which was based on an interventionist government. She effectively changed the mixed 
economy into an economy based on free enterprise. 
Globally, Britain’s privatisation programme worked as a catalyst. Following Britain’s 
success-story, other countries soon followed suit. In the 1990s the role of the state in 
economies worldwide reduced drastically, increasing international capital markets which 
further reinforced globalisation. The individual results per country or region are topics of 
many studies, but the main impact remains: Thatcher’s privatisation programme started a 
trend of economic liberalism in markets all over the world. 
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Conclusion 
 
The idea that Britain had become ungovernable in the 1970s gave rise to Thatcherism. 
According to Thatcherites, it was caused by the perceived post-war consensus, the relative 
decline of Britain, difficult industrial relations and high inflation. This led to the Winter of 
Discontent at the end of the 1970s. The sense of ungovernability created a fertile ground for 
Thatcherism’s radical policies. 
Disillusioned by the state of the country in the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher was attracted to 
the radical policies of Keith Joseph whose ideas were the foundation of Thatcherism. It  
presented itself as a radical break with the post-war consensus. Its main focus was controlling 
inflation, individual freedom and rolling back the frontiers of the state. The goal was to create 
a thriving enterprise economy.  
Privatisation fits in neatly with the main principles of reduced state intervention and 
individual freedom. It also financed the possibility to reduce public spending, an important 
tool for Thatcherites in controlling inflation. One of the main objectives of the privatisation 
programme – the spreading of public ownership through shares – played a significant role 
how privatisation was implemented from 1984 onwards. Public share offering would 
eventually become the accepted privatisation method worldwide. The major privatisations of 
the 1980s reshaped Britain’s economic landscape en sparked privatisation programmes in 
other European countries and regions such as the former Soviet Union and Latin America. In 
that regard, Thatcher’s privatisation programme changed the world economy. 
The main question of this thesis– was the rise of Thatcherism intrinsically linked to 
privatisation and what were its consequences for Britain and the rest of the world? – has the 
following answer. Thatcherism stood for reduced state intervention, individual freedom and 
wider public ownership so a thriving enterprise economy could be shaped. This was also the 
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main motivation behind privatisation. As it also made other objectives possible – controlling 
inflation for example – it can even be said that privatisation was essential for Thatcher’s 
economic policy. Privatisation and Thatcherism are therefore intrinsically linked to each 
other.  
The privatisation programme reduced the role of the state in the economy not just in 
Britain and destroyed the mixed economy. Globally, increased market capitalisations and 
share trade volumes show the increasingly globalised economy, enforced by the privatisation 
and liberalisation programmes of many countries especially in the 1990s. Thatcher’s 
privatisation programme inspired this and her focus on widespread public ownership also 
influenced the accepted method of privatisation. 
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